


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10 June 1966

OCI No. 0293/66

Copy No. 52

# WEEKLY SUMMARY

State Dept. review  
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ARMY review(s)  
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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(Information as of noon EDT, 9 June 1966)

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The government added ten civilians to the ruling Directorate but moderate Buddhist leaders joined ranks with the militants to oppose the Ky regime. The Buddhists now are shifting to nonviolent tactics using religious symbols and hint at broader forms of passive resistance. [ ] Vietnamese Communists indicate they hold little hope for Buddhist success, nor were they enthusiastic about the "struggle" movement.	25X1
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**SOVIET MILITARY INTEREST IN MONGOLIA**

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Moscow may be expanding its military support of Mongolia, probably as part of its renewed defense commitment to Ulan Bator and to further secure its far eastern frontier.

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**THE 13TH CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY CONGRESS**

15

Top party leaders did little to dispel the doubt and pessimism about economic reforms, but they did accede to demands to shake up the central committee membership for greater emphasis on youth.

**Middle East - Africa**

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**PEKING RETAINS INFLUENCE IN ZANZIBAR**

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Peking has responded to recent foreign-policy reverses in Africa by efforts to retain its influence in those places such as Zanzibar where the situation is favorable.

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**CRITICAL NORTH-SOUTH CONFRONTATION BREWING IN NIGERIA**

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The Muslim traditional leaders in northern Nigeria are heading a major effort to check the centralizing reforms decreed last month by General Ironsi's military regime in Lagos.

**CONGO QUIET AFTER EXECUTION OF PLOTTERS**

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The Congolese have taken President Mobutu's execution of four plotters on 2 June fairly quietly.

Western Hemisphere

**CUBAN STATE OF ALERT**

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The shooting of an armed Cuban infiltrator at Guantanamo Naval Base and subsequent US statements were ostensibly the cause for the alert, but more likely it was called to mobilize the country against external subversion and to divert public attention from economic difficulties.

**BOSCH HAS NOT CONCEDED DEFEAT IN DOMINICAN ELECTION**

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He placed a poor second in the balloting and now is apparently trying to recoup prestige. His Dominican Revolutionary Party is contesting the election's legality even though foreign observers say it was fair.

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**VENEZUELAN COMMUNIST PARTY'S POLICIES BOGGED DOWN 23**

The Communist Party of Venezuela, faced with internal dissensions, lack of popular support, public disapproval, and political isolation, has slim prospects for meaningful political gains despite attempts to disengage from armed insurrection.

**URUGUAYAN MILITARY APPOINTMENTS STIR CONTROVERSY 24**

The unprecedented political interference evident in the appointment of a new military commander in Montevideo seems sure to widen the rift between the president of the National Council of Government and the Uruguayan military.

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Far East

VIETNAM

The addition of ten civilians to the government's ruling Directorate failed to prevent moderate Buddhist leaders from joining the militants this week in opposing the government.

This closing of ranks probably resulted from an agreement to utilize nonviolent protests, with more emphasis on religious themes. The Buddhists have probably concluded that their more violent actions had failed either to generate sympathy among an apathetic public in Saigon or to deter firm action by the government.

Saigon troops have moved from Da Nang to within a few miles of Hue in preparation for an operation against the Viet Cong. Their proximity to Hue, however, may be intended to back up the efforts of wavering local military commanders to restore order in the city, and it is possible that the troops may eventually be used to put down the "struggle" movement.

In response to their approach, militant Tri Quang's new clandestine radio urged the Buddhist faithful to place their family altars in the streets in protest. By mid-week, this tactic had clogged main thoroughfares in Hue and Quang Tri city; it was being used to a lesser extent in Da Nang, Qui Nhon, and Pleiku. Tri Quang began a personal hunger strike protesting US support of the Ky government, and other Bud-

dhisths hinted at future boycotts and other "broader" forms of passive resistance.

In Saigon, as expected, the Armed Forces Congress--a body of senior officers who occupy the theoretical seat of government power--ratified the slate of new civilian nominees to the Directorate and then overwhelmingly endorsed Ky and Thieu as premier and chief of state, respectively.

Military Developments


Allied and Vietnamese forces continued several major offensives against Communist troop concentrations and base areas during the past week.

In the highlands, in Kontum Province, Operation HAWTHORNE has thus far resulted in enemy losses of 187 killed, as against allied casualties of 22 killed and 72 wounded. In adjacent Pleiku Province, the surveillance operation on the Cambodian border--codenamed PAUL REVERE--had taken more than 400 enemy lives, in contrast to friendly casualties of 36 killed (16 US) and 195 wounded (154 US).

In coastal Binh Dinh Province, US 1st Air Cavalry Division task force elements northeast of An Khe terminated the highly successful search-and-destroy Operation CRAZY HORSE. The 21-day operation killed 516 Viet Cong/North Vietnamese troops compared with allied losses of 78 killed (64 US) and 233 wounded (198 US).

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


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Communist military activity during the week was highlighted by a battalion-sized assault in Long Khanh Province, and by heavy mortar attacks in Binh Long and Dinh Tuong provinces.

Communists Wary of Buddhists

Although the Vietnamese Communists are still cautiously non-committal in their propaganda treatment of the current Buddhist protest movements and extremist leader Tri Quang, Communist officials of both the Front and Hanoi have recently made clear in private that they hold out little hope for Viet Cong - Buddhist cooperation in the overthrow of the Ky government.



Communist spokesmen were extremely negative about any Front gains to be made from the current unrest, and they were unanimously unenthusiastic about the leadership of the present "struggle" movement. Comments on Tri Quang ranged from a "wait and see attitude" to one of complete distrust.


the Buddhists in gen-

eral were frequently overestimated as a political force in South Vietnam.

Sino-DRV Relations

Evidence continues to mount that North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh has recently been or still is in China. He may have taken some of his lieutenants with him. Both Le Duan and Vo Nguyen Giap were also out of sight in late May.

Ho is not known to have traveled out of the country since 1961. A trip now would suggest some serious and as yet undefined problem in Sino-DRV relations--perhaps connected with the apparent power struggle in Peking--which Hanoi fears might adversely affect North Vietnam's war effort. Past problems, such as the Sino-Soviet squabbling over the nature and delivery of military assistance, have all been worked out by Ho's lieutenants.



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ing the first five months of 1966 now total over 21,000 in confirmed, probable, and possible categories. This total is more than the entire number accepted for 1965. An additional 16,000 infiltrators have been reported by captives but not yet accepted in any MACV category.

Many of these men have undoubtedly been used as replacements for the substantial number of casualties. Nevertheless, North Vietnamese strength in South Vietnam continues to grow steadily. Slightly more than a third of the total North Vietnamese/Viet Cong Main Force strength (35,010 out of a total estimated strength of 97,455 men) is now accepted as North Vietnamese.

25X1 Peking propaganda on Vietnam has fallen off noticeably in the past week, but this appears to be largely a reflection of the extensive coverage being given to the domestic political upheaval. The People's Daily on 8 June, however, strongly supported Hanoi's objection to UN involvement in the elections scheduled for South Vietnam.

Infiltration in 1966

Figures on the infiltration of men to South Vietnam dur-

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## FURTHER DELAY IN INDONESIAN-MALAYSIAN SETTLEMENT

Indonesian domestic problems appear likely to delay a settlement with Malaysia for at least a month.

President Sukarno has refused to sign the agreement reached on 1 June by Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik and Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Razak at Bangkok. Sukarno has continued to insist that a plebiscite be held in Malaysian Borneo before Indonesia recognizes Malaysia and other provisions of the Bangkok agreement are implemented.

In view of Sukarno's intransigence, it appears that confrontation cannot be formally ended until Indonesian Government leaders further reduce his role and strengthen their own position through action by the Indonesian congress (MPRS), now tentatively scheduled to convene in mid-June. Decreasing civilian support for the army and developing fragmentation among civilian political groups, however, could cause a postponement or an abrupt adjournment of the MPRS session.

Sukarno is not the only obstruction to speedy settlement

with Malaysia. Conservative elements in the army have yet to be persuaded to the government's point of view. The large and opportunistic Moslem party, Nahdatul Ulama, has openly criticized Foreign Minister Malik for his efforts to end confrontation.

Malaysian officials appear to understand the domestic complexities facing Indonesian leaders. Plans are going forward for an exchange of military missions which will maintain close contact between the two governments and, presumably, discuss details of the eventual implementation of the Bangkok agreement.

On 2 June Djakarta, following up the intention it announced in April, formally extended recognition to Singapore. On 8 June, Malaysian Prime Minister Rahman, who strongly opposed a unilateral move by Singapore to normalize relations with Djakarta, met with Singapore Prime Minister Lee to discuss Djakarta's move. Following the meeting it was announced that Singapore and Malaysia would establish relations with Indonesia simultaneously once Djakarta had ratified the Bangkok agreements.

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**SECRET****CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERS WHOSE STATUS IS IN QUESTION**

The following officials have failed to show up during a period of intense political infighting in Peking. They may have been jeopardized in the power play which brought down senior politburo member Peng Chen. The evidence is stronger on those marked with an asterisk.

		DATE OF LAST APPEARANCE
<b>KEY SECURITY AND PROPAGANDA OFFICIALS</b>		
*Lo Jui-ching	Army chief of staff; chief of secret police	27 Nov 65
*Lu Ting-i	Director, party propaganda department	Mar 66
*Yang Shang-kun	Mao's personal aide; alternate member, secretariat	29 Nov 65
*An Tzu-wen	Director, party organization department (dealing with personnel)	25 Mar 66
Chou Yang	Deputy director, party propaganda department	3 Jan 66
<b>MILITARY MEN</b>		
*Hsiao Hua	Head of army's General Political Department	27 Mar 66
Nieh Jung-chen	Politburo member; runs advanced weapons program	1 Oct 65
Yang Yung	Commander, Peking Military Region	8 Feb 66
Wang Shu-sheng	Vice Minister of National Defense	20 Jan 66
Hsiao Ching-kuang	Navy commander and intelligence man	23 Feb 66
*Wu Fa-hsien	Air force commander	22 Mar 66
Yang Cheng-wu	Deputy chief of staff	22 Mar 66
Chang Ai-ping	Deputy chief of staff	27 Mar 66
Liao Han-sheng	Vice Minister, MND	Mar 66
Liang Pi-yeh	Deputy director, GPD	14 Feb 66
<b>PROVINCIAL LEADERS</b>		
*Liu Jen	2nd Secretary, Peking	26 Mar 66
*Ou-yang Chin	1st Secretary, Heilungkiang	10 Feb 66
*Tan Chi-lung	1st Secretary, Shantung	29 Mar 66
*Chia Chi-yun	1st Secretary, Kweichow	5 Apr 66
*Li Pao-hua	1st Secretary, Anhwei	Apr 66
*Huang Ou-tung	Governor, Liaoning	6 Mar 66
Chen Pei-hsien	1st Secretary, Shanghai	14 Feb 66
Lin Tieh	1st Secretary, Hopeh	24 Mar 66
Ma Ming-fang	3rd Secretary, Northeast Bureau	Mar 66

\*Probably or almost certainly purged along with Peng Chen

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### LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE IN PEKING

Developments in Peking's current power struggle strongly suggest that the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Teng Hsiao-ping, is edging closer to the top of the party structure. He is the man who has most to gain by the ouster of Peng Chen, his potential rival for leadership of the dominant radical wing of the party. He appears to have been behind the reorganization last week of the Peking city party committee.

Peng's successor as first secretary of the Peking committee is Li Hsueh-feng, who served as Teng's deputy during the 1940s and doubtless owes his substantial rise since 1954 to Teng's steadily growing influence in the highest party councils. The new second secretary of the committee also has past connections with Teng.

It now appears probable that Peng, previously ranked fifth or sixth in the Chinese power structure, fell into disfavor shortly after his last public appearance on 29 March and had been formally stripped of his power by about mid-May. The first phase of the struggle seems to have ended, but the party press clearly indicates that more heads will roll. New attacks have been directed upon second-echelon officials in several provinces as well as in Peking. The technique is similar to that used to build the case against Peng, and the approach is equally cautious and deliberate.

The targets for the new phase have not yet been brought into focus. People's Daily warned on 4 June, however, that anyone trying to make China the stage for a repetition of "the ugly drama of Khrushchev's usurpation of party, army, and state power" will be knocking his head against a brick wall. This suggests that Teng Hsiao-ping now will attempt an extensive housecleaning of potential enemies, high or low, replacing them with his own men. The reference in the editorial to "army" opponents is the first sign that military figures may soon be implicated.

While this struggle has been going on, attention to developments in the outside world has dropped off, indicating top-level concern with the more immediate developments at home. The Chinese say that the regime's most dangerous enemies now are domestic ones. The Liberation Army Journal, which has been in the forefront of the struggle, asserted on 7 June, "Tigers with a smiling face are ten times more ferocious than tigers with their fangs bared and their claws unsheathed." 25X1

[redacted] posters, wall slogans, and local newspapers dealt with domestic issues, with "almost nothing" on Vietnam or other problems abroad. While this is likely to be a passing phenomenon, it looks as if foreign affairs are for the moment being managed by secondary officials following well-established guidelines. 25X1

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## EAST ASIAN REPRESENTATIVES TO GATHER IN SEOUL

The Ministerial Meeting for Asian and Pacific Cooperation, which was originally engineered by South Korea as a mechanism for enhancing its prestige and given little chance of playing any significant role, now has some prospect of initiating useful regional consultations. The improved outlook for the conference, scheduled to open in Seoul on 14 June, owes much to Thai initiatives and a more forward-looking Japanese attitude. The Thais hosted a preparatory meeting in Bangkok in April which dispelled the fears of some would-be participants that the meeting would deal primarily with controversial military and political issues and that it would be too obviously pro-Western. This was accomplished by formulating an agenda emphasizing cultural and technical cooperation. The Thais also have taken the lead in persuading the nine participating countries to send their foreign ministers to enhance the significance of the conference.

The Thais, Filipinos, and Koreans also are eager to explore the prospects for a regional organization. Others, notably the New Zealanders and Australians, regard such discussion as premature. They would probably be willing, however, to consider establishing a permanent secretariat to facilitate regional consultation, provided the conferees in Seoul show that such a body can and will steer clear of controversial issues that affect the national interests of the participating states.

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
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## DE GAULLE'S VISIT TO THE USSR

Top French officials are playing down the prospect that major agreements will result from De Gaulle's trip to the Soviet Union which begins on 20 June.

Earlier, the diplomatic counselor at the Elysee said that De Gaulle sees the trip in an "historical" context and as a way of contributing to his long-standing objective of a détente in Europe. Other government sources have also played down the specific political purposes of the trip, and the US Embassy in Paris believes De Gaulle is not planning any political surprises.

Drafting of a communiqué to be issued when the visit ends is believed to be well along. It may contain some reference to the German question and may make general mention of the European security issue.

France publicly supports German reunification and opposes recognition of East Germany. These positions will make a meaningful joint French-Soviet statement on Germany difficult. "European security" was given prominent but imprecise treatment in communiqués which

followed the exchange of visits by the French and Soviet foreign ministers last year. 25X1

minor agreements were likely in the cultural and economic fields. Some additional agreement on joint development of color television, a general space cooperation agreement with details to be worked out later, and an agreement for Renault to assist in Soviet auto production appear the most likely.

De Gaulle will be accompanied by a small entourage including Foreign Minister Couve de Murville. According to a Foreign Ministry official, De Gaulle's suite was chosen to emphasize the protocol nature of the trip and to quiet speculation that political subjects would be discussed in detail. The French ambassador in Moscow has indicated that only two mornings have been set aside for formal talks with Soviet leaders.

During his extensive tour De Gaulle is expected to make a number of public appearances, including one on Soviet television. He will speak at Moscow University, the Novosibirsk Academy of Science and in Volgograd. 25X1

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## SOVIET MILITARY INTEREST IN MONGOLIA

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Moscow may be expanding its military support of Mongolia, probably as part of its defense commitment to Ulan Bator and to further secure its far eastern frontier.

The presence of Soviet service units has been acknowledged in the Mongolian press. The British chargé in Ulan Bator states that although these Soviet troops may be working on civilian construction projects, he has not been allowed to travel to Choybalsan in eastern Mongolia, which he believes would be a logical location to station a mobile military force. On the other hand, the Soviets would be likely to avoid major overt moves of a kind which would be exploitable by Chinese propagandists.

The USSR has given the Mongolians surface-to-air missiles. The Soviets probably will aid in the construction of sites for these missiles and will conduct exercises to test their effectiveness.

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## THE 13TH CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY CONGRESS

After five days of discussion, beginning on 31 May, some 1,600 delegates left the party congress in Prague with vague hopes but with no clear picture of just what is planned for the future.

Top party leaders did little to dispel the doubt and pessimism that pervaded the party before the congress. They all tried to smooth over differences between conservatives who opposed and liberals who favored the political, social, and economic reforms adopted at the congress. They also revealed their deep concern over the party's failure to overcome political apathy and suspicions of the reforms, especially among youth.

Delegates asked the leadership pointed questions on all topics except foreign policy. Presidium member Kousky laid down the line at the outset, rejecting earlier foreign criticism of the party's new path and calling for solidarity with the Communist world consistent with Prague's freedom to determine its domestic course and its right of dissent in bloc councils.

Party leaders were impatient with criticism from intellectuals and youth, but nevertheless bowed to pressures generated over the past several years by these vocal elements and approved a shake-up in the membership of the central committee with emphasis on youth. New members now constitute 43 percent of that body; in contrast

to past years, nearly half the committee is under 45 and is university educated. The party leadership was slightly liberalized with the addition of two new men.

The party reaffirmed the economic reform program, but the congress did not come to grips with its major problems. Party chief Novotny also said that failure to improve the quality of production and to combat waste continues to significantly hinder economic progress. He cited the need, without giving specifics, to use more scientific methods of management in order to increase efficiency. Premier Lenart admitted that worker discipline and morale were low but offered no solution, except hopes for a future reduction of the work week.

Novotny and Lenart paid lip service to greater operational independence of enterprises. They indicated, however, that central guidance in carrying out economic policies will be increased and party control over economic activity will be maintained. Party officials were told to stop getting involved in day-to-day management of enterprises.

Neither the complete five-year plan for 1966-70 nor an approved set of rules for enterprise management were ready to be presented to the congress, an indication of continued disagreement over economic policy and management.

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### Middle East - Africa

#### PEKING RETAINS INFLUENCE IN ZANZIBAR

Peking has responded to recent foreign-policy reverses in Africa by efforts to retain its influence in a few countries where the situation is favorable. One such place is Zanzibar, where Peking is diligently exploiting the continued dominance of radical elements and the inability of the Tanzanian Government to establish effective control over the island.

Spearheading the Chinese effort are more than 200 Chinese officials, technicians, and advisers. Most of these are "experts" in such widely diversified fields as well drilling, medicine, and government printing. Their advice includes efforts to nudge the radical Zanzibaris into an even more pro-Peking frame of mind.

There is also a small staff of Chinese military advisers training Zanzibari military units on Zanzibar and on the sister island of Pemba. Chinese ships have delivered limited quantities of small arms and ammunition, and

further deliveries are probable.

[redacted] the Chinese may provide a coastal defense craft, which may be staffed in part by Zanzibaris receiving naval training in China.

Peking is making good on a \$14-million loan offered Zanzibar prior to the 1964 union with Tanganyika. More than \$2 million has already been turned over to Zanzibar. Early this year the Chinese acceded to a demand from Dar es Salaam that loan agreements be signed by Tanzanian officials rather than by Zanzibari officials, but Peking will doubtless attempt to continue dealing directly with the Zanzibaris.

The large Chinese presence has caused concern among some Zanzibaris. This concern is being fanned by Soviet and East German officials in Zanzibar. At present, however, the Chinese influence in Zanzibar is much greater than that of the Soviets or East Germans. [redacted]

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### CRITICAL NORTH-SOUTH CONFRONTATION BREWING IN NIGERIA

The Muslim traditional leaders in northern Nigeria are heading a major effort to check the centralizing reforms decreed last month by General Ironsi's military regime in Lagos.

Politically fortified by the wave of essentially antisouthern demonstrations in most of the main towns in the north they may even be prepared to go as far as secession.

The still powerful traditional authorities--the emirs and chiefs--support the demonstrators, but their exact role in planning the protests which began on 28 May and which are still continuing on a localized basis is not known. At a meeting last week convoked by the northern military governor the chiefs expressed strong opposition to the government's reforms, reportedly threatening to secede unless concessions were made. They submitted to the military government recommendations which are said to call for a return to federalism and for a constitution drafted by a civilian regime. Most observers believe the emirs exercise strong control over their followers and are in a position to play a commanding role in the north.

Lagos' initial public response has been a strong warning that while in office the military regime intends to run the government its own way under a unified command. On 8 June, the Supreme Military Council also declared that it would resist pressure from "any quarter" and "no longer tolerate" any disturbances. This bold

front was accompanied by some gestures designed to placate the north, including a promise of "massive assistance" to the less developed areas in order to end fears that any one section of the country would dominate.

Otherwise, the council merely took note of the emirs recommendations and said that a "suitable reply" would be sent them. Virtually the only concession made was the announcement of the formation of a commission to investigate the causes of the disturbances.

The hard-line the Supreme Council now is taking appears unlikely to intimidate the emirs for long nor dilute the intense animosity in the north against the southern Ibo tribesmen. The government has issued many warnings in the past weeks but apparently has been reluctant to use the army to enforce its edicts in situations involving fighting between tribal groups. Whether it will be able to do so now and succeed is uncertain.

The army now is deployed in five northern cities. It has been the main factor in controlling the disorders, but the loyalty of northern soldiers has not been fully tested. In the event of further rioting, tribal elements in the army and the police may take sides. The police were effective in breaking up the 28 May demonstration in Kaduna, but did little to protect the lives and property of the southern Ibo tribesmen once the disorders spread.

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Hundreds of Ibo refugees from the disturbed areas now are reported to be fleeing southward. A large-scale exodus of these tribesmen from the north, where they have played an important role in the economy and administration, would cause deterioration and interruption of some essential services. The arrival

of increasing numbers of these "refugees" in their native provinces may also stimulate their fellow tribesmen to retaliate against northerners living there. Even assuming that the violence does not add to the presently estimated 100 killed and 500 wounded in the rioting of the past two weeks, Nigeria probably faces a prolonged period of instability. [REDACTED]

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## CONGO QUIET AFTER EXECUTION OF PLOTTERS

The Congolese have taken President Mobutu's execution of four plotters on 2 June fairly quietly.

The dominant Congolese reaction to the executions seems to have been one of shock mixed with respect for Mobutu's decisive use of power. Nevertheless, immediately after the executions there was some talk in Leopoldville of overthrowing him, and there were three explosions in the city the night of 4 June.

The opposition apparently centered in the Bakongo tribe, the largest in the Leopoldville region and one to which one of the plotters belonged. Mobutu's

troops set up checkpoints at key spots in the city for a brief period, and since then there has been no significant sign of opposition.

The country does appear, however, to be in for a period of relatively tough rule. The regime has rounded up several politicians who apparently were implicated by the plotters. Although further executions to emphasize last week's lesson seem unlikely, the politicians probably have reason to fear lesser punitive action as well as general harassment at the hands of Mobutu and his military cohorts. [REDACTED]

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Western Hemisphere

**CUBAN STATE OF ALERT**

The shooting on 21 May of an armed Cuban infiltrator at Guantanamo Naval Base and subsequent official US statements concerning the incident were the ostensible reasons for a nationwide Cuban state of alert on 27 May. In a 4 June speech, President Dorticos implied that the US had been "forced" to set aside its aggressive designs when faced with Cuban vigilance and "revolutionary determination."

That Castro believed the US was planning to attack is questionable, but there is little doubt that he was concerned over threats against his life.

On 29 May, two exiles captured near Havana during an infiltration attempt reportedly "confessed" that they were on a mission to assassinate Castro. Two days later, Havana radio announced the arrest of an agent also allegedly on such a mission. The regime undoubtedly knew of these subversive operations prior to the announcement of the alert, and it is possible that the plots were the real basis for the general mobilization.

In his 4 June speech, Dorticos admitted as much, saying:

"The events that have taken place ...all...at the same time made obvious the enemy tactic, and it was rational to believe that these threats had something behind them and that we had to prepare for that something without delay...."

A variety of explanations have been offered as to why Castro may have artificially escalated the crisis. He may well have wanted to divert public attention from economic difficulties, highlighted most recently by the poor sugar harvest. One Cuban Foreign Ministry official reportedly stated that Castro wanted to make the USSR reaffirm its commitment to defend Cuba if attacked. This rationale was later supported by the Soviet ambassador. The Cubans also probably wanted to test the alert system and gauge the state of mind of the people, whose enthusiasm and confidence in the regime may be declining.

Whatever political advantages resulted from Castro's alert, they will hardly outweigh the disadvantages the mobilization created in the Cuban economy.

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## BOSCH HAS NOT CONCEDED DEFEAT IN DOMINICAN ELECTION

Juan Bosch has yet to concede his defeat by Joaquin Balaguer, who is to be installed as president of the Dominican Republic on 1 July. Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) has contested the legality of the balloting, regardless of the almost unanimous opinion by foreign observers that the election was fair.

Of the 1,320,000 votes cast--up 20 percent over 1962--Balaguer received 57 percent. Bosch received approximately 39 percent, and Rafael Bonnelly placed a poor third. Balaguer's margin of victory came from rural areas and small towns, but he also cut heavily into Bosch's strength in Santo Domingo. Balaguer's sweep gave his Reformist Party (PR) majorities in both houses of the Congress.

Bosch seems unable to accept defeat without rationalizing that victory was stolen from him. He now is apparently trying to retain leadership of the Dominican left despite a loss of prestige, and to placate radical PRD elements who desire all-out opposition to Balaguer. He has assured party moderates, however, that he intends to embrace the new government eventually and will not sanction strikes or anti-Balaguer agitation.

Bosch's meeting with Balaguer may be the first of a series of attempts to pressure the new chief executive into adopting major social and economic reforms. Balaguer, who has been courting second-echelon PRD figures, was noncommittal--although obviously mindful of Bosch's still considerable influence, especially among the politically articulate.

Balaguer has made plain his reluctance to see the Inter-American Peace Force leave until he is solidly in office. He has linked its eventual withdrawal to the resolution of major security problems, such as disarmament of civilians and the integration of rebel military into the armed forces.

Extremist attempts to bar Balaguer's installation by force seem unlikely. Only minor disturbances have occurred in the wake of the election, and none of the country's three Communist parties appears to have any firm plans for violence. The 14th of June Revolutionary Movement, whose Santo Domingo legislative candidates fared poorly in the balloting, may feel compelled to stage a militant demonstration next Tuesday on the seventh anniversary of the anti-Trujillo invasion from which the organization derives its name.

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## VENEZUELAN COMMUNIST PARTY'S POLICIES BOGGED DOWN

The Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV) faces serious problems in its attempts to shift emphasis from armed insurrection to political action. The PCV politburo favors this move and seems to control a majority within the party, but diehards such as top guerrilla leader Douglas Bravo, are in open rebellion against the leadership.

The leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR), the only PCV ally, continues to favor armed insurrection, bringing relations between the two parties to an all-time low. Furthermore, the PCV lacks full control over its action front, the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN), which will probably continue to delay full application of the PCV political line. Eventually, some of the more militant Communists in the FALN may join with MIR and non-Communist FALN members to form a pseudo-political terrorist organization free of PCV control. Even if it obtains significant aid from abroad, which is unlikely, such an organization would have little better prospects than does the present FALN.

The PCV is fragmented and weak; its activities are practically paralyzed because of differences over policy, serious shortage of funds, and lack of significant progress in any of its endeavors. Despite inactivity, however, PCV guerrillas and urban terrorist groups remain intact for possible operations.

The keystone of the PCV political program is the formation of a broad united front. This objective has so far been unattainable. The PCV has fallen into public disfavor because of its terrorist campaign and thus has no appeal to the major political parties, which are unwilling to associate with discredited advocates of violence. The PCV seems to have some influence only in the insignificant far leftist National Revolutionary Party (PRN).

Consequently, although abandonment of guerrilla warfare and urban violence in favor of legitimate electoral activity may result in acquiring legal status and freedom of action for the PCV, its prospects for gaining a meaningful position in Venezuelan politics remain bleak.

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### **URUGUAYAN MILITARY APPOINTMENTS STIR CONTROVERSY**

The Uruguayan National Council of Government has approved the long-delayed appointment of General Mario Aguerrondo as commander of the key First Military Region (Montevideo). Council President Alberto Heber successfully forced the appointment despite considerable opposition in high military circles.

Aguerrondo, a competent officer and a militant member of the governing Blanco Party, represents hard-line rightist thinking. He is not popular among military officers, most of whom belong to the opposition Colorado Party. Moreover, his name has been linked in the past with various coup plots.

Widely respected Army Inspector General Pereira, whose prerogative it is to make command changes, had opposed Aguerrondo's appointment, but acquiesced in it under pressure from the defense minister. Pereira now has resigned and has been succeeded by General Hugo Tiribocchi, a Colorado.

The Aguerrondo appointment underscores Heber's determination,

in the face of widespread opposition, to place "his man" in control of the Montevideo region, where most of the country's military forces are stationed. Although the appointment in itself does not imply that a coup by Heber is imminent or even under consideration, the move does place Heber and his supporters in a much better position to supersede the National Council if they feel such a step is necessary.

Nevertheless, this unprecedented political interference in military appointments seems sure to contribute to widening the rift between Heber and the majority of the Uruguayan military at an unfortunate time. The current quiet in Uruguay is fragile, and tension seems sure to rise as November's general elections near. Trouble could develop if economic or political conditions deteriorate further, or if the popular will for constitutional reform of Uruguay's unwieldy government appears about to be balked.

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